Do political tensions harm economic relations? Theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade, but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange. Looking at two major economies, we show that negative events have not hurt US or Japanese trade or investment flows. We then examine specific incidents of tensions in US-French and Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade --two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations. Aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations. In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations. We argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes.
Introduction 1
Do political tensions have economic consequences? The relationship between economic interdependence and conflict has been a central debate in international relations. Leading scholars contend that "states with good relations should have more trade than states with poor relations" and import decisions of firms will respond to "the climate of friendliness or hostility that exists between the importer and exporter" (Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998, 650, Pollins 1989b, 739) . Analysis of trade and conflict in a simultaneous equations model concludes that "political relations are driving commerce, not the other way around" (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004, 1175) . We re-examine these arguments in the current globalization era to show that sunk costs reduce incentives for state and private actors to link political and economic relations.
Political relations vary along a continuum from cooperative normal relations, to political tensions, to threats of force, and to war. While most analysis of the interdependence debate focuses on militarized disputes, we analyze the shift at the lower level from normal relations to political tensions. As noted by Pevehouse, "much of the nuance of interdependence theory has been discarded" in recent empirical studies that use dichotomous measures for conflict, and new insights may be gained by returning to the earlier approach in the literature that measured conflict and cooperation with events data (Pevehouse 2004, 247) . A large range of interactions determine the status of political relations between states. By political tensions, we mean disagreement over policy issues, hostility between leaders, and negative public sentiment. In the contemporary world, occasions when states threaten force are rare, but tensions are frequent.
To the extent that political tensions are an element of a state's calculation about the likelihood of future conflict, it represents a variable underlying realist theory. At the same time, to the extent that political tensions act as a catalyst for business lobbying to improve relations, it represents a variable underlying liberal theory. The focus in the existing empirical analysis on explaining direct conflict neglects the need to test the threshold at which causal mechanisms connecting political and economic outcomes come into operation. This paper takes a first cut at this task by evaluating linkages between politics and economics at the level of conflict escalation when bilateral relations move into a period of political tensions.
Whereas most research on trade and conflict has been based on the two world wars and Cold War period, we assess whether claims that trade follows the flag or leads to commercial peace still apply in the current era of globalization. Not only is major power war unlikely, but interdependence has become a background condition for most states, and strengthened international rules govern trade and investment. Theories about linkages between economics and politics need to be updated to reflect the current reality of a fully globalized economy.
We examine the economic relations of the United States and Japan as two major economies. We first analyze the response of aggregate trade and investment patterns to negative events. Here we follow the approach of previous literature to model conflict as a continuous event count variable while taking advantage of a new events dataset and quarterly economic data for a more precise analysis. Then we closely examine specific incidents of political tensions in the bilateral relationships between the United States and France and between Japan and China from 1990 to 2006. This choice of cases allows us to evaluate the effect of political tensions during the post-Cold War period in two different security contexts: between allies and between regional rivals. The cases also include variation in the regime that could affect freedom of civil society to engage in boycott activities and capacity of governments to intervene. We closely examine the timing of shifts in political relations to observe any impact on aggregate trends in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as on iconic industries such as French wine and Japanese autos, and we compare them with the political and economic relationship with third countries. We find no observable evidence that political tensions harmed economic relations (after controlling for material factors unrelated to the political tensions, such as GDP and the exchange rate between the two currencies). Analysis of the years from 1990 to 2004 shows that the number of negative events reported in the media does not reduce the trade or investment flows for either the US or Japan in their economic relations with other countries. Neither have they suffered economic harm from high profile political tensions with leading economic partners. These are puzzling findings, which counter both public commentary and many theoretical studies that link political and economic relations. This paper addresses the paradox of solid, and even stronger, economic ties in the face of weakened political ties. The first section lays out the existing arguments in the literature about the spillover from the political to the economic realms and introduces our revised liberal hypothesis about why, in an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations. We draw on theories in economics and marketing about sunk costs that prevent economic actors from updating behavior in response to new conditions. Not only intra-firm contracting relationships, but also consumer purchase decisions exhibit strong path dependence. Section two probes evidence from US and Japanese trade and investment patterns, where we find no significant spillover. The final section revisits the hypotheses and concludes that sunk costs in existing trade and investment relations make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change behavior in response to political disputes.
Theoretical Perspectives on Economic Interdependence and Conflict
The business community shows genuine concern about the economic impact of political tensions and the media gives sensational coverage to boycotts. But from a theoretical standpoint, why is it puzzling that political tensions between two countries would have limited impact on their economic relations? In this section we discuss how both realist and liberal theories generate expectations for feedback, and then present our theory about how economic relations in an era of globalization involve sunk costs that act as a buffer to absorb political shocks.
Politics first
From the realist perspective, political factors that influence the likelihood of future conflict will affect economic relations. States concerned about survival must be cautious about economic activities that could create vulnerability or strengthen a future rival (Kirshner 1999, 71, 75) . Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield argue that interstate alliances affect the pattern of international trade because states will have less concern about the security externalities gains from trade produce if they strengthen an ally rather than an adversary (Gowa and Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade 1993) . Shifts in alliance stability and the level of security threat motivate use of economic statecraft to serve political purposes (Mastanduno 1998 , Skalnes 2000 .
A related argument is that "trade follows the flag" because private actors closely observe political relations and update their expectations about future conflict. Brian Pollins argues that importers trade with friendly countries in order to manage risk and minimize potential economic disruption (Pollins 1989b) . Consumers "express goodwill or solidarity toward those whom they identify as friends, while shunning or punishing those they perceive as foes" (Pollins 1989a, 739-40 Moreover, states holding similar policy positions on most global issues are more likely to trade (Dixon and Moon 1993) . Shared democratic institutions also affect trade flows positively because economic actors are more knowledgeable about consumer tastes, business trends, and government regulatory constraints (Bliss and Russett 1998, Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998) . Trust also matters. Even when controlling for standard predictors of trade levels in a sample of European states with common political orientation, states with higher trust measured by Eurobarometer surveys have statistically significant higher levels of trade, portfolio investment, and direct investment (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2009 ).
We can derive from these arguments the hypothesis of politics first: Rising political tensions lead governments to adopt policies that reduce economic interdependence and encourage business actors to shift trade and investment to other partners. This hypothesis suggests that political tensions would lead to a downward trend of economic exchange with that country relative to stable or increasing economic ties with other countries.
Economics first
By contrast, liberal theories of international relations have long emphasized the commercial peace argument that economic interdependence creates vested interests opposed to conflict. From Montesquieu to Adam Smith to contemporary liberals, scholars have argued that free trade encourages peace. Zeev Maoz conducts an extensive battery of statistical tests and finds strong support for the liberal paradigm that economic interdependence reduces conflict (Maoz 2009 ). In other words, economics prevails over politics. These arguments are based on the premise that political conflict harms economic interaction.
The "commercial peace" literature offers two mechanisms to explain why economic relations inhibit interstate hostilities (Barbieri 2002, Mansfield and Pollins 2003) . First, the traditional view has been an economic interest model (Oneal and Russett 1997, Polachek 1980) .
Private actors who expect to benefit from continued commerce lobby to restrain the state from engaging in conflict (Copeland 1996 , Kastner 2007 , Mansfield 1994 , Papoyouanou 1997 ).
Business pressure is expected to encourage positive relations with economic partners and not just rally against war. Second, in information models economic interdependence promotes peace by deepening transnational ties. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer argue that states with interaction through trade and capital markets have policy tools short of war by which to signal their dissatisfaction with another state and demonstrate their own resolve (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001) .
Both versions of the commercial peace argument depend on the assumption that political conflict harms economic interaction. In the economic interest models, fear of economic harm from deteriorating political relations creates the incentives to support good political relations. In the information models, observable economic harm from political conflict is necessary to provide the costly signal of resolve. Thus even lower threshold political tensions are relevant, since signaling through changes of economic behavior often occurs below the threshold of militarized conflict (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001, 405) . Indeed, Morrow argues that militarized conflict has little impact on trade because economic actors adjust their trading activities before a dispute occurs in response to lower level changes of political relations Sacko 2002, Morrow 1999, 488) .
We can derive from these liberal arguments the hypothesis of economics first: Rising political tensions will have a negative impact on economic relations that motivates business actors to lobby their governments and signals high resolve to the opponent. Improvement of political relations would be expected to follow.
Economic ties absorb political shocks
Both of these simplified versions of realist and liberal views on economic and security linkages are based on an image of state-society relations that no longer fits the current era of globalization. The "politics first" argument portrays the state having substantial control over economic actors while "economics first" portrays economic actors with substantial influence over political leaders. Yet debates on comparative political economy point to the need for a more nuanced approach to the balance between states and markets (Berger 2000 , Kahler and Lake 2003 , Keohane and Milner 1996 . On the one hand, governments retain some autonomy to select how they respond to market pressures and interest group demands. On the other hand, the development of a global economy with low trade barriers, capital mobility, and multinational firms has constrained the ability of states to direct trade or investment flows to meet national goals. World trade rules (GATT Article XXI) allow for economic sanctions in the case of national security or international emergency, but raising tariffs over smaller political differences could lead to potential challenges and retaliation in WTO dispute settlement. Governments that are competing to attract investment may be unwilling to intervene in economic affairs for fear of losing confidence of investors. As liberalization has broadened across a wide range of countries, few are now free to engage in politicized economic policies, such as impeding trade in response to political conflict.
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Instead of responsive linkages between economic and political trends, we may observe path dependence of economic relations as businesses consider sunk costs in existing trade and investment flows. Economists have developed theoretical models to show significant hysteresis exists in bilateral trade flows and empirical evidence indicates that firms export decisions are influenced substantially by consideration of these costs (Baldwin 1988 , Dixit 1989 , Roberts and Tybout 1997 . Sunk costs for export firms include information about market conditions for successful product selection and development of distribution, sales, and servicing networks.
Once firms have established exports to a particular market, they do not quickly change their trading patterns. FDI presents even greater sunk costs since there is duplication of production facilities (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) .
Trade rules and capital mobility increase the cost of unilateral government actions to restrict commerce. We offer a revised version of a liberal hypothesis.
Intra-industry trade and FDI often require firms to sink costs in assets dedicated for specific markets. The existence of economies of scale underlies intra-industry trade with specialization in differentiated products. In addition to the constant labor component, the firm bears a fixed cost for skilled labor necessary to produce the differentiated product independent of the quantity produced (Helpman and Krugman 1994, 141) . Production techniques and branding of products also support increasing returns from the initial investment. Differentiated product markets are less likely to be perfectly competitive. A firm trading commodities on a market exchange can more easily switch to alternative suppliers than a firm that relies on relational contracts in a market with imperfect substitutes. Costs of movement are substantial for the firm engaged in intra-industry trade, irrespective of industry adjustment at national level (Gilligan 1997, 462) . This shift in trade structure is especially relevant to the period of this study. Between 1970 and 1997, intra-industry trade as a share of national trade grew from 50% to 77% in the United States, 66% to 76% in France, 23% to 39% in Japan, and 10% to 44% in China (Kono 2009 ). Consumers also face sunk costs in purchasing decisions and are therefore reluctant to change their behavior in the face of political tensions. For one, as marketing researchers have long documented, consumers invest information-seeking, knowledge, and emotional costs in brands and products --a concept referred to as "brand loyalty" and "product attachment" (Kotler 2002 ). They are not likely to participate in a boycott when forgoing a preferred good is costly for them. Klein, Smith and John refer to this as "constrained consumption," and show few consumers are willing to make the sacrifice inherent in boycotting (Klein, Smith and John 2004) .
Moreover, consumers may reject a national boycott, even if they agree with the political message, because of collective action problems. Either they perceive that their individual contribution will be too small to make any difference on foreign policy, or they believe that they can free-ride on the boycott decisions of others (Klein, Smith and John 2004, Sankar, GurhanCanli and Morwitz 2001) .
The growth of transnational business also reduces incentives for private actors to respond to political trends. Firms engaged in regional production networks that subcontract components may not easily find replacement suppliers. Those that sell to foreign affiliates have little reason to punish their own subsidiary. Consumers may be unable to express political preferences in ways that would connect with national origin of goods because leading American, European, and Japanese brands increasingly are attached to goods made elsewhere. Indeed, firms manipulate consumer perceptions through marketing strategies. Advertisements using a national image to sell the product can be replaced with more localized appeals that disguise national identification.
Such stickiness in economic transactions works against any reversal prompted by realist concerns, but also undermines the credibility of the commercial peace mechanism -if everything goes forward with business as usual regardless of politics, there is no pressure applied for improving political relations. Businesses will fail to lobby, and no costly signal communicates preferences. Politics and economics are separate.
We can derive from these arguments the hypothesis of separation of politics and economics: Governments will not directly intervene in the economy for political reasons, and private actors will be slow to change trade and investment patterns in response to worsening political relations. This hypothesis suggests that political tensions will have little effect on market interactions. This argument points to a different mechanism for liberal interdependence in which economic ties promote peace as a shock absorber of tensions rather than as a trigger for lobbying by vested interests or as a costly signal of preferences.
First Test: Measuring Political Tensions with Event Count Data
Previous literature has analyzed events data to measure levels of conflict and cooperation in dyadic relations among states, and we use this as our starting point. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) was used by Pollins in his classic article showing the effect of political relations on bilateral trade relations (Polachek 1980 , Pollins 1989b . This data series coded diplomatic events reported in newspapers, and has been modified to weight events according to significance (Goldstein 1992) . Gary King and Will Lowe provide the most recent and comprehensive events dataset, which extends on the approach of these earlier surveys using computer-coding of media reports (King and Lowe 2003) In regression analysis we examine the effect of negative events (defined below) between the US and its partners on their level of economic exchange measured as exports, imports, and FDI outflows. A parallel analysis is conducted for negative events between Japan and its partners. We include all partners (152 countries) over the period 1990 to 2004. We implement a gravity model of trade to estimate bilateral export and import flows when controlling for the variables that provide a baseline expectation for trade levels between two countries. This specification explains the log value of trade as a function of the log of the joint income of two countries and the log of the distance between them (Anderson and Wincoop 2003) . We estimate the models with ordinary least squares and include the standard set of "resistance" factors such as geography (islands trade more, landlocked states trade less), trade agreements (GATT/WTO and PTA), alliance ties, and common language. We also add a control for the exchange rate, since shifts in currency values change the relative prices of imports and exports and therefore affect their demand and supply. A similar model is used to examine FDI outflows, with the addition of a control for the presence of a bilateral investment treaty between the two countries. 4 We add to the standard specification an independent variable for political tensions, which measures negative events with either government or citizen level origin between two countries. 5 Each event has been coded with a "Goldstein score" weighting its significance, i.e. a military attack would receive score -10, cutting off aid would receive -5.6, and issuing a formal complaint or protest would receive -2.4. Our political tension variable sums negative Goldstein scores for the dyad in each quarter (reported as positive values in log form). We also include a hostility variable for the proportion of all events between the two countries in a dyad that involve high hostility levels, which uses the cutoff of events coded as more serious than a threat or warning, i.e. those involving demonstrations, formal reduction of relations, expulsion, seizure, or force. 6 Using quarterly trade data and summing events data for each quarter allows us to give more fine-tuned analysis. In the main models, we examine the effect of negative events lagged by one quarter to account for the likely delay of response. Each model is estimated first with quarter fixed effects to control for common shocks to the economy across dyads in a given 4 The specification for FDI d iffers fro m the gravity model because the dependent variable takes both positive and negative values and so cannot be analyzed in log form.
period and including the standard gravity model variables to explain country variation with robust standard errors clustered by country. A second estimation drops the time-invariant variables and uses country fixed effects to control for country specific features in addition to the quarter fixed effects. This specification analyzes how variation of events over time within a particular dyad relationship influences their economic exchange.
The results in table 1 indicate that there is no significant relationship between negative events and economic relations. In none of the U.S. models do political tensions measured by the negative events score of the dyad or hostile events as proportion of total events reach standard significance levels, and the sign is in the wrong direction for the models that do not include country fixed effects. Further analysis suggests there may be a negative effect on U.S. exports, but the results are sensitive to specification and substantively small. Table 1 here US imports and FDI flows appear impervious to tensions and the relative level of hostility. The Japanese evidence is even more surprising -looking at the data political tensions are associated with increase of exports and FDI! Since the events data are lagged, it seems unlikely there is reverse causation where an increase of FDI or exports causes negative events. Increasing the lagged period for events variables up to one year or adding a lagged dependent variable does not substantively change the conclusion. In a further robustness check, we examine the sub-sample of developing country trade partners. One might expect that power asymmetry would increase the likelihood that governments manipulate economic policies for political goals. Even for these asymmetric dyads, however, the political tensions are not significant (results not shown).
7 Negative events only are significant for country fixed effects model of US exports when excluding hostility variable; Then coefficient -0.015 (s,e, 0.007, p-value 0.025), wh ich means 10% increase of events is associated with less than 1 percent decrease of U.S. exports.
These results are surprising and highlight the need to look more closely at specific cases of political tensions where one can identify the timing and nature of the shock to political relations and follow the reactions of states and private actors.
Evidence from Two Case Studies of Political Tensions
The Franco-American and Sino-Japanese relationships over the past decade provide recent instances of political tensions arising between states with deep economic ties. Differences between the pairs permit exploration of the hypotheses with variation in security relations as we compare political tensions between two allies and between two regional power rivals. In January 2004, a group of business executives formed a group called Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA), designed to mobilize the U.S. business community to address rising anti-Americanism. Since then, BDA, whose motto is "Anti-Americanism is bad for business," has been quite active in emphasizing to American companies how foreign animosity could hurt businesses in the U.S. and in engaging their members to take action (Reinhard 2004 ). The picture presented by BDA is bleak: "The costs associated with rising anti-American sentiment are exponential. From security and economic costs to an erosion in our ability to engender trust around the world and recruit the best and brightest, the U.S. stands to lose its competitive edge if steps are not made toward reversing the negativity associated with America." To probe the effect on trade flows, we conduct regression analysis that allows us to control for other factors that affect bilateral trade. Essentially, this analysis allows us to predict the amount of trade that would have occurred between the two countries irrespectively of their degree of political animosity. We can then examine whether the period where that animosity was most acute leads to any significant deviations from regression predictions. As in the analysis of events data, we apply a gravity model specification using OLS to estimate bilateral U.S. trade flows with quarterly data. Whereas the events data ended in 2004, for this analysis we extend to cover the period from 1990 to 2006, which includes both a substantial period before the Iraq war spike of tensions and three years after a return to normal relations in 2004. Table 2 presents the results for analysis of U.S. trade. First, in model 1 and 4 we look at the time series of U.S.-France exports and imports (67 observations of quarterly data), using only the time variant factors GDP and exchange rates as explanatory variables and an indicator variable for the period of political tensions. Next, in model 2 and 5 for exports and imports respectively, we examine U.S. trade with all trade partners. Finally, models 3 and 6 include both country and time fixed effects while dropping variables that do not vary by country.
Table 2 here
We measure political tensions as an interaction between the specific trade partner and the The first model for US exports to France suggests a strong pattern of trade following the flag with a negative and significant coefficient for the Iraq political tensions variable.
9 Yet the hypothesis of politics first has implications for differentiation of trade among allies and adversaries, which calls for comparison with other countries. In the cross-national analysis of U.S. trade, we find that there was a negative but not statistically significant effect on U.S.
exports to France and U.S. imports from France. The model tells us that when conditioning on country, time, and standard variables used to explain trade patterns, trade with France was no different during the period of political tensions than if there had not been political tensions. More surprising is the finding of a significant and large negative effect for U.S. exports to Spain and the UK respectively during this same period.
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We also examined industries more likely to be subject to consumer boycott effects due to their association with national origin and substitutability. Using annual industry data (5 digit SITC), we tested the same model on U.S. imports of five luxury products associated with France:
A significant negative effect on U.S.-France trade in the cross-national sample appears when we measure tensions as the quarter after the U.S.
invasion (not shown). But again, U.S. exports with allies in the Coalition of the Willing experienced a larger decline. Although we hesitate to put any causal interpretation to these results, the analysis shows that there was no substantively important differential effect on trade from the heightened political tensions in a standard regression model of trade.
9 Guy Michaels and Xiaojia Zh i also find deterioration of relations between U.S. and France reduced bilateral t rade (Michaels and Zhi 2010) . They estimate the effect of crisis as change of trade shares after 2002, whereas we assess the rise and fall of tensions impact on trade levels. 10 In model 2, The -0.054 coefficient fo r Iraqpt*France and -0.118 coefficient for Iraqpt*UK indicates that the period of tensions corresponds to 5% decrease of exports to France relative to an 11% decline of exports to the UK. 
Sino-Japanese Rift Over Yasukuni Shrine Visits
Observing political tensions. In July 1996 Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto caused outrage in China when he visited Yasukuni shrine, which is dedicated to the spirits of Japan's war dead including those executed as war criminals. He announced he would not make another visit during his term as Prime Minister in order to avoid harming diplomatic relations. Statistical analysis shows that Japanese exports to China are more than would be predicted by the standard variables that determine trade. Parallel to the analysis of U.S. trade discussed above, we conducted regression analysis of Japanese exports using variables from the gravity model specification and quarterly data from 1990 to 2006. We focus on Japan's exports rather than imports because the boycott calls were one-sided in nature arising from Chinese public and private condemnation of Japanese government actions, in contrast to the two-sided condemnation that occurred in the U.S.-France dispute. In table 3, Models 1 and 4 examine the time series of Japan-China trade, while other models include the cross-national sample. industry, we also find that high salience Japanese exports such as cars, beer, and cameras did not suffer negative impact from the Koizumi administration -to the contrary there is a positive and significant coefficient for Japanese auto exports (see supporting information). Where Chinese consumers could most readily target Japanese goods, we cannot detect any boycott effect.
During his five years in office from

Table 3 here
Direct foreign investment represents a substantial component of the Japan-China economic relationship. After the United States, China is the largest destination for Japanese FDI.
During the period of the Koizumi administration when political relations were at their worst, China was taking a growing share of Japan's FDI. In 2001, Japanese FDI to China was 3.3 percent of total FDI, and by 2006 it had doubled to 6.7 percent, while over the same years FDI to the United States declined from 46.7 percent total FDI to 34.8 percent share (Japan China Business Guide 2008). For China, Japan has for many years been the largest source of FDI inflows. We are not suggesting that political tensions perversely increase investment, but rather that tensions did not prevent other factors that contributed to Japan's booming bilateral investment relationship with China during this period.
Clearly the aggregate trends indicate that Sino-Japanese economic relations were deepening even as political relations worsened. Next we look at whether Toyota suffered from anti-Japanese sentiment as the flagship company for Japan's export industry that competes with other multinationals deeply engaged in trade and investment with China. Toyota's vehicle sales to China rose from a mere 13,400 in 2001 to 183,500 in 2005, which represents a higher growth rate than its sales in the United States or other large developing country markets like Brazil and India. In China, Toyota's sales outpaced the two leading major foreign automakers GM and
Volkswagen as well as the average growth in total vehicle consumption in the Chinese market (Cooney 2006 ).
Interviews and surveys about business plans also do not show evidence of a strong reaction to worsening relations. A representative from the Japanese business organization, Keidanren, noted that while shrine visits may be followed by sudden cancellation of business meetings or an increase in the price on the table for a contract negotiation, in the long term contracts were not cancelled (Interview 2005 ). An official of a Japanese financial investment firm heavily involved in business with China said China's boycott calls were famous for having no effect (Interview 2006) . The number of firms said to consider downsizing or withdrawal of business remained at a low 4 percent one month after the April 2005 anti-Japanese riots in China (JETRO June 2005). Trade and investment between Japan and China has been growing at such a rapid pace that political problems have at most been a cautious wind cooling optimism.
Why a Firewall Between Political Tensions and Economic Exchange?
The central finding that there has been no substantial economic fallout from political tensions challenges the realist hypothesis about the primacy of politics and the liberal hypothesis about the mobilization of economic actors. We revisit these hypotheses and explain why high levels of mutual economic interdependence discourage both governments and business actors from letting politics interfere with economics.
The "politics first" hypothesis suggests that states should direct economic flows towards states with whom they share closer political relations, and businesses should shift their exchanges to "safer" countries. The evidence from our case studies shows quite the opposite, however, with economic interdependence increasing parallel to worsening political relations.
One explanation would be that the studies predicting "politics first" emphasize long term structural changes such as alliance shifts and conflict escalation. In our cases, expectations that there would not be a major disruption of political relations may have moderated the response of economic actors. In other words, tensions between France and the US and between Japan and China were not high enough to trigger a shift in expectations. As shown by Copeland, expectations of future trends condition how actors view interdependence (Copeland 1996) .
Indeed, the United States and France remained committed partners in NATO. Japan and China were not contemplating imminent war. When governments chose not to intervene in economic activities, this in itself signaled to private actors that political tensions would not further escalate.
However, one should not dismiss the seriousness of both episodes of tension. Some perceived the Franco-American split over Iraq as shaking the foundations of the Atlantic alliance. Certainly relations between Japan and China were tense over both symbolic issues related to history and territorial disputes (Calder 2006) . we observe little evidence of such activity (Mastanduno 1998 ) . Our findings suggest that it requires a very high threshold of political conflict to trigger "politics first" behavior.
The "economics first" hypothesis claims lobbying restrains political squabbles before they cause serious economic damage. Yet when we examine the level of business lobbying, it appears to have been neither substantial nor effective. In the U.S., Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA) was formed with fanfare to combat the perceived deleterious effects of antiAmericanism on business. But their mandate was never to lobby the administration in order to shift the course of American foreign policy, and they never tried to do so. In France, some business groups (mostly in the wine and luxury goods industry) complained in early 2003 about the potential economic fallout of President Chirac's hard stance against the U.S., but this did not seem to change the course of French foreign policy either (Interview 2006) . In Japan, some businessmen voiced concerns, but the major business organization, Keidanren was notably circumspect about directly approaching the issue (Interview 2005).
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In both the Franco-American and the Sino-Japanese cases, governments were unwilling to intervene because they valued ongoing economic ties and trade rules that prohibit arbitrary discrimination against the imports or investment of one country. Boycotts remained unofficial and government-led sanctions were not imposed. For example, after three weeks of anti-Japan
Since economic flows were largely unimpeded, the business lobbying that would operate as the mechanism for a commercial peace restraint did not take place (He 2008 (Shirk 1994 , Naoi 2007 . Finding no intervention in the Japan-China case is a strong test, although it is consistent with Etel
Solingen's findings that regime type does not determine economic liberalization or protectionism (Solingen 1998, 113) . Nonetheless, procurement and regulatory policies may be areas where political conflict leads to policy discrimination.
The cases also show that businesses on both sides saw the market as too great to sacrifice.
In Japan, Toyota officials say they expect China to become the biggest auto market (South China Morning Post 2005) . The head of a major Japanese private equity firm operating in China said in December 2005 that "We are not necessarily optimistic about our China investments, but we would never exclude China from our portfolio" (Abdelal and Lane 2006, 15) . On the Chinese side, only a small number of retailers took actions to support the boycott, citing that with complex distribution channels they were importing through mainland suppliers rather than necessary to specify the causal mechanisms and conditions under which the relationship holds.
How much latitude do states have to direct economic flows in this era of globalization? None of the governments involved in the political feuds we examine exerted a concerted effort to interfere with economic exchange. In a period of liberalized economies and multinational companies, governments find it difficult to dictate economic outcomes according to political interests and face greater penalties for doing so. Market actors appeared unfazed by political tensions. Sunk costs in existing economic relationships inhibit firms from switching purchase and investment plans, while consumers remain stuck in their habitual buying patterns.
Given the evidence from our cases that political tensions short of war do not produce economic harm, the business lobbying for improved political relations expected by commercial peace theories may not take place. If severe crisis with high certainty of militarized conflict is the necessary trigger, one must question whether at such a late stage economic interests would be able to pull countries back from the brink of war. Economic interdependence may be unable to prevent conflict as hypothesized by current literature on commercial peace. Nonetheless the resilience of economic interdependence to political crises creates a buffer zone of normal business interactions that dilute the harm from political tensions.
The customary image of globalization portrays constant flows of information with heightened volatility as actors react to every bit of news or shift in perceptions (Friedman 2005 ).
On the contrary we find that there are some dimensions on which globalization induces stickiness. Political feuds are contained because sunk costs are sufficient to deter linking economic decisions to the status of political relations. In an era of globalization, economic relations withstand a wide range of gloomy news about political tensions between countries.
These findings notwithstanding, political tensions still have the potential to harm economic relations in a globalized world. Future research should explore the threshold at which tensions begin to harm economic relations. The duration or frequency of political conflict may be important if longer or repeated periods of tension induce indirect effects such as the decline of brand prestige. It is also important to consider different policy dimensions through which governments may influence economic outcomes, most notably public procurement which might be more susceptible to the bilateral political climate. In the cases studied here, however, it was "business as usual" despite political disputes between leaders, boycott calls, and media hype. All models include quarter fixed effects, even models add country FE. Bold indicates 5 % significance level. Standard error in italics. Note: The unit of analysis is a directed dyad with the United States and its trade partner for a quarter time period, and the dependent variable is the natural log of U.S. exports to the trade partner (measured in 2000 U.S. dollars). Models 1 and 4 present the time series for U.S.-France trade with Newey-West standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation up to a 4 period lag. Other models include the full sample of U.S. trade partners. Models 2 and 5 include quarter fixed effects and show robust standard errors clustered by trade partner. Models 3 and 6 include both quarter and country fixed effects (not shown). Coefficients in bold type are significant at 5 percent level. Note: The unit of analysis is a directed dyad with Japan and its trade partner for a quarter time period. Political tensions are measured by indicators for Koizumi administration period (models 1-3) and quarter after Yasukuni shrine visit (models 4-6). Models 1 and 4 are the time series for Japan-China trade and estimate Newey-West standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation up to a 4 period lag. Other models include the full sample of all Japanese trade partners in cross-section time series analysis. Models 2 and 5 include quarter period effects and estimate robust standard errors clustered by trade partner. Models 3 and 6 add country fixed effects. Coefficients in bold type are significant at 5 percent level.
